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ABSTRACT:Information asymmetry occurs when information is held by one, but not all parties 
to a transaction. Information symmetry is related to the principle of good governance practices. 
This paper focuses on the value of principle based governance practices.. We investigate that 
whether firms thatcomply with the principles of good corporate governance incur lower 
financing cost, stable share prices .lesser dependence on debt and a stronger financial standing. 
Disclosure and transparency in corporate governance parties is the responsibility of the board 
and leads to equitable treatment of shareholders as all have the same information related to the 
company putting none at a disadvantage to the other. Furthermore the firms that have better 
governance practices enjoy lower cost of capital and are financially more viable, suggesting that 
good governance reduces the destabilizing behavior of the investor as they become better 
informed through adequate disclosure by the firm, and mitigates agency problems between the 
controlling shareholders and managers on one hand and minority shareholders and other 
stakeholders (creditors, banks, financial institutions etc) on the other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Some users of financial information can 
obtain more information about an enterprise 
than others. This is clearly there is the case 
of insiders of a company that is managers 
and other top executives. This leads to 
information asymmetry and nullifies the 
effects of good governance practices The 
strive for higher governance and disclosure 
standards puts forward that better 
information dissemination can reduce 
information asymmetry and market 
uncertainty  about a firm and enable 
investors to become more behaviorally 
stable.   
Firms provide information on disclosure 
through regulated financial reports including 
the financial statements, management 
discussion and analysis and otherregulatory 
filings .There are also voluntary 
communications such as management 
forecasts, conference calls, press releases, 
internet sites and other corporate reports. 
Finally, disclosures are made by firms by 
information intermediaries such as financial 
analysts, industry experts and financial 
press. However complexity in the financial 
statements likely makes the information gap 
between insiders and outsiders more 
pronounced.  
DISCUSSION 
Agency problems arise when a manager who 
is an agent of the shareholders and is 
expected by the shareholders to work 
towards maximizing their wealth, conceals 
important information from the shareholders 
due to his own personal interest. Good 
governance practices i.e. information 
symmetry is intended to alleviate agency 
problems and bring about transparency in 
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the working of the company for outsiders. 
During the Asian financial crisis period, 
weak governance and agency problems gave 
rise to corporate concern- financial 
weakness and poor managerial decisions. 
Hence emphasis is given to the role of good 
governance practices. Good disclosure 
practices or quality disclosures make it 
easier for outside investors to observe any 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the 
insiders. Managers, sometimes when the 
situation of the company is negative, have 
strong incentives to minimize the possibility 
of shareholder unrest by controlling the 
fluctuations in the performance measures, 
thereby misleading shareholders with 
respect to the relativeriskiness of the firm. 
They keep the shareholders in the dark as 
they are afraid to present the real picture of 
the firm especially if the firm has had some 
pertinent risks or is experiencing lower 
performance levels so that the investors do 
not withdrawinvestments from the firm or 
sell off their shares, which in turn will lead 
to lower share prices. Adequate disclosure 
by firms is necessary as manipulation or 
misrepresentation by managers due to 
information asymmetry will lead to a loss of 
investor confidence in the quality of 
company information and that in turn will 
lower the price that they will pay for its 
securities. 
According to Mautzand May, financial 
disclosure is essential to the functioning of a 
free enterprise economy. Financial 
disclosure is required to support a viable 
capital market. A viable capital market is 
essential for resource allocation within the 
economy. In a capital market, there are 
many new entrepreneurs and existing 
companies that would like to attract 
household saving in order to fund their 
ventures. However, even though the 
entrepreneurs and savers would like to do 
business with each other, the information 
problem arises as entrepreneurs have better 
information that the savers about the value 
of opportunities of business investment and 
have incentives to overstate their value. 
Thus, savers will be reluctant to park their 
funds in ventures about which they have 
little or no information. 
Another problem that arises in the capital 
market is the agency problem as the savers 
will not actually participate in the 
management of the company in which they 
invest, which is the responsibility delegated 
to the entrepreneur. The self-interested 
entrepreneur can expropriate the funds for 
its own interest i.e. he may acquire 
perquisites, pay excessive compensation or 
any such non- beneficialexpenses which is 
harmfulfor the interest of the savers. 
Asymmetric information and adverse 
selection and moral hazard 
Types of risks associated with information 
asymmetry 
1) Adverse Selection: This is a risk 
exposure to the lender of funds 
before the money is lent or invested. 
In order for the lender to lend funds 
to the borrower ,complete 
information about the riskiness of the 
borrower in terms of his credibility 
and money handing power has to be 
there. Adverse selection means 
selection of any borrower for the 
lender’s funds who is willing to pay 
the rate of interest demanded by the 
lender, without taking into account 
the credit worthiness of the borrower 
.In such cases a borrower with a 
lower risk will reject the offer if the 
rate of interest charged by the lender 
is high while a borrower with a 
higher risk will readily accept the 
offer as they will not get a better 
offer given their credit history.This is 
a case of adverse selection as due to 
information asymmetry between the 
lender and borrower ,the lender has 
made an uninformed decision to 
select a borrower with a higher risk 
just because he was willing to pay a 
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higher rate of interest and who may 
not repay back the money to the 
lender. 
2) Moral Hazard: This is a risk after the 
financial transaction has taken 
place.Information asymmetry also 
leads to moral hazards i.e. when the 
money lent is not used for the 
purpose for which it was intended 
and is used for taking unnecessary 
risks.. Here, the lender does not have 
information about how the company 
or the borrower will use the money. 
For instance- a company in the U.S 
once used the funds of investors in a 
Ponzi scheme instead of investing 
the money as the investors intended. 
They were paying the investors who 
were withdrawing their money with 
the money received from new 
investors. During the 2008 credit 
crisis, more money was being 
withdrawn than was coming in, so 
finally the Ponzi scheme collapsed 
and the money of the investors was 
never recovered. 
Ways to reduce the risks of adverse 
selection and moral hazards 
 The risks of adverse selection and 
moral hazard make direct financing 
by small firms difficult since people 
are unwilling to invest in unknown 
entities or entities about which very 
little information is known. Here, 
financial intermediaries play their 
part as they have reliable information 
about the companies. These 
intermediaries can extend financing 
to these firms who otherwise cannot 
get it on their own. 
 Another remedy for information 
asymmetry is more information 
about potential receivers of funds 
which can be obtained through the 
databases on individuals and 
businesses. Their past credit 
worthiness can be used to gauge their 
future credit worthiness. 
 Collateral requirement on loan can 
also reduce information asymmetry 
risks. Collateral reduces moral 
hazard risk as the borrowers have the 
fear of losing their collateral if they 
do not make required payments. 
 The requirement of minimum net 
worth will also reduce adverse 
selection as only those businesses 
will be considered for loans that have 
a sufficient net worth. 
 Another method for reducing moral 
hazard is financing through equity 
finance i.e. issuing stocks to 
employees as a part of their 
compensation package thus reducing 
the need for external financing. 
Information asymmetry and its impact on 
a firm. 
Adequate disclosure by a firm and its cost of 
capital are inversely related: Information 
asymmetry is only a subset of investor’s 
knowledge about each firm. If the firm can 
increase the size of this subset, by the 
voluntary release of information, its market 
value will rise as good reporting leads to 
informed investors, who because they 
understand the company, will pay a fair 
price for its securities. Voluntary disclosures 
reduce information asymmetry between the 
market and the firm which facilitates trading 
in its shares. The resulting increase in 
market liquidity attracts large institutional 
investors who can, in the future, sell large 
blocks of shares without lowering the price 
they receive. The firm’s share prices 
increase as a result of this greater demand. 
Also, with the investors being well informed 
about the company perceive less risk in 
investing in it and thus demand a lesser risk 
premium, in turn leading to a lower cost of 
capital for the firm. Also, due to the higher 
prices of shares the primary security issue 
will be priced higher and thus the net 
proceeds from the issue will be higher 
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leading to a lesser requirement for debt. 
Thus, the firm will experience a lower cost 
of capital. 
 Adequate disclosures lead to equilibrium in 
share prices: Adequate disclosures will 
minimize the fluctuations in company’s 
share prices. Fluctuations in share prices 
occur due to information asymmetry .If the 
securities market are in possession of full 
information, the ignorance and uncertainty 
on the part of the investors will be reduced 
and share prices will tend to maintain 
equilibrium. 
Also , information asymmetry makes 
shareholders reluctant to sell their shares , 
thus making it difficult for acquirers who 
can enhance the firm’s value , to gain 
control over the firm. 
Companies generally do not like to reveal 
too much information, put up collateral etc. 
However the more information they reveal 
and the more they maintain the credit 
worthiness of the company, the lesser will 
be their need to depend on 
externalfinancing. Thus, information 
symmetry benefits companies more than if 
they conceal information. 
CONCLUSION 
Information asymmetry is when in a 
transaction between two parties, one party 
has more knowledge or information related 
to the transaction thus putting the latter at a 
disadvantage. This is applicable to 
transactions of outsiders with companies as 
well. Good governance practices in the form 
of adequate disclosure leading to 
information symmetry and transparency is 
essential for the smooth working of a 
company. Agency problems arise due to 
information asymmetry where the manager 
of the company, who is an agent of the 
shareholders, conceals valuable information 
from them for his own gain. Financial 
disclosure is also essential to support a 
viable capital market where savers have 
lesser information about the investment than 
the entrepreneurs and hence will be hesitant 
to park their savings in a venture about 
which they have little or no information. 
Thus they need to be given proper 
information. Information asymmetry in case 
of companies also leads to adverse selection 
where those borrowers may be selected who 
isrisky, by the lenders as little or no 
information is available about their credit 
worthiness. .It also leads to the problem of 
moral hazards as the funds given to the 
borrower may be used for purposes other 
than what it was intended. Financial 
intermediaries can help reduce the risk of 
information asymmetry as they act as a link 
between the lenders and borrowers, 
providing information to the lenders as they 
are well equipped with information about 
the borrower or company. Thus, instead of 
direct financing, funds are parked with 
financial intermediaries. 
Information symmetry and cost of capital 
are inversely related as more information 
about the company means more investor 
confidence in the company. These investors 
in turn demand a lower risk premium 
leading to a lower cost of capital for the 
firm. Adequate disclosures will also lead to 
equilibrium in share prices as well informed 
investors will maintain equilibrium in the 
share market. 
Thus, companies benefit from good 
governance practices in the form of 
information symmetry and disclosure 
through a lower cost of capital, equilibrium 
in share prices and lesser dependence on 
external debt for financing its ventures. 
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